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The U.S. Senate’s failure to pass gun control legislation is the
victory of an intense minority against an apathetic majority
Despite support from around 90 percent of US citizens in the wake of 2012’s Sandy
Hook School shooting, expanded background checks for gun purchases failed in the
US Senate. Laurent Bouton, Paola Conconi, Francisco J Pino, and Maurizio
Zanardi write that this ‘gun-control paradox’ can be explained by the fact that the
intensity of voters’ preferences differs across policy issues, and voters only have one
vote with which to hold politicians accountable on a bundle of issues. A model
incorporating these features predicts Senate voting behaviour very well, finding that
Senators closer to re-election are more likely to vote pro-gun, and only Democrats
‘flip-flop’ on guns.
On 14 December 2012, 20 children and six staff members were murdered in a
shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut. Building on
the surge in public support for gun control that followed this tragedy, President
Obama announced the formation of a task force to provide immediate
recommendations on how to introduce new gun regulations to end the “epidemic of gun violence shaking the
nation.”
A year has passed and Congress has been unable to introduce stricter gun regulations, despite broad public
support. As pointed out by The Economist:
“when the push for more gun control began shortly after the Newtown shootings last December, the
focus fell on three areas: assault weapons, high-capacity magazines and background checks. But
the enthusiasm for new gun laws quickly faded, and it became obvious that efforts to ban assault
weapons and high-capacity magazines would not win enough votes to pass. So gun-control
advocates were left to pursue an expansion of the background-check system. In the end, even that
was too ambitious.”
On 17 April 2013 even the mild
effort to require background
checks on private sales at gun
shows and online failed in the
Senate. This may seem
surprising, given that all polls
carried out at the time showed
that a vast majority of US citizens
supported this measure. As
President Obama put it: “How
can something have 90% support
and yet not happen?”.
Explaining the gun-control
paradox
The reluctance of US
congressmen to support gun-control regulations, despite the fact that most US citizens are in favour of them, has
long been a puzzle. Schuman and Presser (1978) referred to this puzzle as the “gun-control paradox”. As argued
by Goss (2006), one possible explanation is that “American gun owners are intense, well organized, and willing to
vote for or against candidates purely on the basis of their position on gun control”. They are a “highly motivated,
intense minority”, who prevail over a “relatively apathetic majority”.
In a recent paper, we formalise this idea and provide empirical evidence that electoral incentives lead politicians
to take a pro-gun stance, in line with the interests of a minority of the electorate. We propose a theoretical model
in which politicians vote on a primary and a secondary policy issue. The former is an issue that a majority of voters
cares relatively more about, such as the level of public spending. The latter is meant to capture gun control – an
issue that a minority cares more intensely about. The minority may also be better-informed about the incumbent’s
choices on the secondary policy issue. In this setting, citizens have only one vote to make their representatives
accountable on a bundle of policy issues. Politicians may thus pander to the minority on the secondary issue,
without losing too much support from the majority. The model delivers three testable predictions:
First, politicians should be more likely to take a pro-gun stance at the end of their terms, when their policy
choices have a bigger impact on their re-election prospects.
Second, only politicians who are in favour of gun regulations and are concerned with re-election should
‘flip-flop’ on gun control, since they face a tension between their policy preferences and their re-election
motives.
Finally, election proximity should have no impact on the voting behaviour of politicians who are against gun
regulations and/or are not concerned about re-election.
Voting behaviour in the US Senate
To assess the validity of these predictions, we examine the determinants of Senate votes on gun regulations over
the period 1993–2010. The staggered structure of the US Senate – in which members serve six-year terms and a
third is up for re-election every two years – provides a quasi-experimental setting to verify whether election
proximity affects the voting behaviour of politicians on gun-related legislation. For any given vote, we can compare
the behaviour of senators belonging to three different ‘generations’, i.e. who will be up for re-election at different
times.
In line with the model predictions, we obtain three main results:
First, the oldest generation of senators (i.e. those facing re-election within two years) is more likely to vote
pro-gun than the previous two.
The effect is sizeable, and robust to using different econometric methodologies and samples of votes, and to
including a wealth of controls for other drivers of senators’ voting behaviour on gun control. The pro-gun effect of
election proximity continues to hold when, rather than exploiting variation in the voting behaviour of different
senators, we study the behaviour of individual senators over time.
Second, only Democratic senators flip-flop on gun control – in the last two years of their term, the
probability that they vote pro-gun increases by between 15.3 percent and 18.9 percent.
Finally, election proximity has no impact on the voting behaviour of senators who are not concerned with re-
election, either because they are retiring or because they hold very safe seats.
Our results of the determinants of gun-control votes can help understand why Congress has not introduced stricter
gun regulations in the wake of the tragedy in Newtown, despite overwhelming public support. Our empirical model
does indeed predict the failure of the Senate to pass the Manchin–Toomey amendment on background checks last
April. Based on our estimates for the period 1993–2010, we would have correctly predicted 93 out of 99 senators’
votes on the Manchin–Toomey amendment on 17 April 2013, excluding the Majority Leader Harry Reid, who voted
against the amendment for procedural reasons. The Senate came short of the 60 votes needed to overcome a
filibuster and move ahead with the legislation. Our predicted margin (51–48) is very close to the actual one (53–
46), again excluding Harry Reid.
In representative democracies, policy choices often diverge from what the majority of the electorate wants. Our
analysis suggests a twofold explanation:
1. Voters differ in the intensity of their preferences over different policy issues; and
2. They only have one vote to make their representatives accountable on a bundle of issues.
Obviously, financial pressure by lobby groups can also contribute to the lack of congruence between politicians’
choices and the preferences of the majority. Indeed, our empirical results confirm that senators who receive larger
amounts of campaign contributions from gun-rights lobbies are more likely to take a pro-gun stance. Still, financial
pressure by lobby groups cannot account for the pro-gun effect of election proximity on senators’ voting behaviour
– even after controlling for the contributions received by individual senators throughout their terms, we find that
they are more likely to vote pro-gun when they are closer to facing re-election. The power of gun-rights lobbies like
the NRA may thus not only lie in their deep pockets, but also in the fact that their members are single-issue voters.
In principle, citizens’ initiatives could help to achieve better congruence between citizens’ preferences and policy
outcomes, by unbundling different policy issues. In particular; stricter gun controls could be introduced in US
states that allow ordinary citizens to place new legislation on a ballot for approval or rejection. For example, the
Washington Universal Background Checks for Gun Purchases Initiative, also known as Initiative 594, may appear
on the 4 November 2014 ballot in the state of Washington. If approved by voters, the measure would require
background checks to be run on every person purchasing a gun in the state of Washington – even those who are
doing so via private sales. However, even in the case of citizens’ initiatives, the intensity of voters’ preferences
matters. For instance, organising initiatives is very costly both in terms of time and money, and citizens who
strongly oppose gun regulations may be more willing to incur such costs. In addition, pro-gun citizens may be
more willing to incur the costs of voting (e.g. spending time to register, rearranging work schedules, getting to the
polls, and gathering information on the candidates). Thus an intense minority can still prevail over an apathetic
majority.
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